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Abstract: 
 
Equity-based crowdfunding is emerging as an increasingly important source of entrepreneurial 
financing. This paper examines the effects of informal institutions on entrepreneurs' ability and 
willingness to engage in efforts to raise equity crowdfunding. It also investigates how informal 
institutions are linked to investors' response to ECF. Also reviewed are the differences in the 
effects of informal institutions on equity crowdfunding vis-à-vis other forms of crowdfunding. 
The paper also delves into factors that are likely to lead to the development of favorable informal 
institutions from the standpoint of equity crowdfunding. It utilizes inductive theory-building 
approach. 
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Article: 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Equity-based crowdfunding (ECF)1 is emerging as an increasingly important source of 
entrepreneurial financing. For instance, “business and entrepreneurship” category accounted for 
27.4% of total CF volume in 2012, which increased to 41.3% in 2014 (Reuters.com, 2015). One 
estimate suggested that the Internet-based ECF (IECF) market was US$400 million worldwide in 
2013, which increased to US$1.1 billion in 2014 (Feit, 2015). In 2014, ECF accounted for 30% 
of all seed capital in the U.K. (Exporter, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, economies worldwide vary greatly in entrepreneurs' efforts to raise and investors' 
propensity to invest in ECF. For instance, per capita ECF in 2015 was estimated at US$0.003 in 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of different types of crowdfunding: (1) crowdlending, (2) equity crowdfunding, (3) reward-based 
crowdfunding and (4) donation-based Crowdfunding, see Kshetri (2015). 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, US$0.23 in Asia Pacific and US$8.32 in the 
U.S. (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The sizes of ECF market in selected regions and associated informal institutions. 
Economy ECF ECF per 
capita per 
yeara 
Key characteristics of informal institutions from the 
standpoint of ECF 
Asia Pacific region 2015: US$948.3 million 
(csj.hkics.org, 2016). 
2015: 
US$0.23 
China: incompatibility of “success-obsessed” culture 
with failures in startup ventures (ST, 2016). 
India: people care less about social causes and are less 
likely to offer money if there is no financial return 
(Chaudhary, 2013). 
China, Indonesia and other countries: less comfortable 
in trusting a stranger (Dan, 2013, ehipnews.com, 2013). 
Lack of trust in online transactions in China, Indonesia, 
Singapore and other countries (Dan, 2013, 
ehipnews.com, 2013, Soh, 2013). 
China and other countries: investment culture 
incompatible with ECF which is associated with an 
uncertain return, bank lending dominates corporate 
financing (Liang, 2015, Walter et al., 2003). Investment 
options more similar to ECF such as VC stock and bond 
are relatively new. 
Canada 2014: US$70 million 
(Henderson, 2015) 
2014: US$2 Reliance on banks for investment guidance, a “risk 
capital investment fatigue, lack of education, success 
stories and media attention on ECF (Conkin and 
Cormick, 2015). 
LAC 2015: US$2.05 million 
(Wardrop et al., 2016) 
2015: 
US$0.003 
Low levels of trust (Canigueral, 2015). Trust mainly 
resides within the” jus sanguinis” (“the right of blood”) 
and not in strangers (Lagos, 2001). 
The Netherlands 2015: US$5.04 million 
(CrowdfundingHub, 2016) 
2015: 
US$0.29 
Europe: social stigma attached to bankruptcy. 
Entrepreneurs going to bankrupt are viewed as “losers” 
(European Commission, 1998). 
The Nordic Region 
(Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden) 
Mid-2012 to mid-2015: 
US$7.8 million 
(Crowdfinders, 2016) 
2012–2015: 
US$0.09 
The U.K. 2015 (first 10 months): 
US$219 million 
(Crowdfinders, 2016) 
2015: 
US$4.10 
The U.S. 2015Q1: US$662 million; 
2014Q4: US US$483 
million (Crowdfinders, 
2016) 
2015: 
US$8.32 
2014: 
US$6.07 
Entrepreneurial failure considered to be part of the 
learning process (European Commission, 1998). 
Success stories and media attention related to ECF 
Investment culture that can easily be adapted to the 
context of ECF. 
a Some data have been extrapolated in order to compare per capita per year figures across economies. 
 
It can be argued that like any economic phenomenon (Parto, 2005), ECF has institutional 
components and implications. Before proceeding, some clarifying definitions are offered. 
Institutions are “macro-level rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 27), which include: a) formal 
institutions such as rules, laws, constitutions; and b) informal institutions such as social norms, 
conventions and self-imposed codes (North, 1996). Informal institutions can also be viewed as 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars in Scott's (2001) conceptualization of institutions. 
Legitimacy related to normative and cognitive institutions can be mapped to “morally governed 
behavior”, and “recognizable, taken-for-granted behavior” respectively (Scott et al., 2000, p. 
238). Institutionalization is defined as the process by which a practice (e.g., ECF) acquires 
legitimacy and achieves a taken for-granted status (Kshetri, 2009). For instance, ECF is said to 
be institutionalized if this practice is legitimated by regulators, investors, entrepreneurs and other 
relevant actors. Institutional field is “formed around the issues that become important to the 
interests and objectives of specific collectives of organizations” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 352). 
Institutional field members are entities that have a voice in influencing institutional norms 
regarding the issues involved and participate in the negotiation on these issues (Kshetri, 2009). 
 
In the context of ECF, the first observation is that most economies have not yet enacted ECF 
legislation. This means that ECF-related formal institutions are not well developed in most 
countries. For instance, according to a 2015 report of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO),2 which was based on a survey in which twenty-three member countries 
participated, only eight–Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S.-- 
had “bespoke” ECF regulations. Four--Brazil, South Korea, India and Mexico-- were planning to 
do so. The remaining economies relied on general securities and financial services laws to 
govern ECF (Torris, 2016a). The countries participating in the IOSCO survey are big and/or rich. 
Indeed most small and/or developing nations lack ECF laws. For instance, as of 2015, Malaysia 
was the only Southeast Asian country to have ECF legislation. 
 
Entrepreneurs are raising ECF even in countries without ECF regulations. For instance, as of 
September 2016, India lacked ECF laws (Crowdfinders, 2016) but had over half-a-dozen equity 
CF platforms (ECFPs). During the eighteen months leading up to September 2016, Indian ECFPs 
raised US$ 52–67 million for about 200 companies (Menon, 2016). Likewise, as of early 2016, 
China lacked formal ECF legislation. Nonetheless ECF is a dominant segment in the Chinese CF 
landscape (Zhang, 2016). Barriers related to informal institutions are even more pronounced than 
formal institutions to raise ECF. Whereas the U.S. has an investment culture that can easily be 
adapted to ECF, China lacks such a culture. For instance, until the early 2000s, bank lending 
accounted for 90% of corporate financing in China, which reduced to 55% in 2012 (Walter et al., 
2003). Due to the relative newness of individual investments, new channels such as ECF are 
viewed as high risk investments (Liang, 2015). 
 
Three primary problems motivate this paper. First, prior researchers have found that while 
crowdfunding platforms (CFPs) eliminate most of the distance-related economic frictions such as 
monitoring progress, providing input, and gathering information, they do not eliminate social 
frictions (Agrawal et al., 2011). Such frictions are related to interpersonal relations, especially in 
early-stage funding in entrepreneurial ventures (Agrawal et al., 2013). Social frictions, which are 
related to informal institutions, thus have special relevance and implications for ECF. In this 
regard, prior research suggests that institutions play a major role in determining what might be 
regarded as a prudent decision (Ostrom, 2005). The literature is mostly silent regarding the 
                                                          
2 The IOSCO sets standards for the securities sector. Its members are the world's securities regulators. 
causes and consequences of such frictions. Also it is not clear if the degree of social frictions 
varies across countries. 
 
Second, prior research (Kshetri, 2015) and anecdotal evidence (Conkin and Cormick, 2015) 
suggest that investors in different countries view ECF differently. Marcus News of Canada's 
ECF marketplace for retail investors, InvestX noted that Canadian investors are more reluctant 
than U.S. investors in investing in ECF. Among the causes of Canada's relative backwardness in 
ECF include historical reliance on national banking institutions for investment guidance, a “risk 
capital investment fatigue” caused by the crash in public company venture capital (VC) markets 
and the lack of education, success stories and media attention (Conkin and Cormick, 2015). ECF 
is more institutionalized in the U.S. than in Canada. However, little is known about factors that 
drive ECF's institutionalization. 
 
Third ECF has important features that make it different from other forms of CF. An important 
way in which ECF differs concerns the direction and amount of the flow of money. For instance, 
whereas donation- and reward-based CF are characterized by a uni-directional flow of money 
(from the contributors to the project initiator), in an ECF the flow is bi-directional (from project 
initiators to crowdfunders and vice versa). In order to understand the possible differences in 
crowdfunders' behaviors across different types of CF, it is also important to understand 
investment motivations. Prior research suggests that people behave differently in situations 
involving money. For instance, in an experiment, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2009) found that 
about a third of the participants demanded no compensation for their investments of time, 
whereas almost all demanded compensation for equally costly monetary investments. This logic 
can be extended to argue that crowdfunders may behave differently in different types of CF. For 
instance, in most cases, donation-and reward-based CF involve insignificant amounts of money. 
ECF is different. On the ECFP, Crowdfunder.com, the average investment is about US$25,000. 
On the other hand, the most common contribution rewards CFP Kickstarter is US$25 (Barnett, 
2014). Brzozowska and Gałuszka (2015) analyzed relationships between project initiators 
(musicians) and contributors in an ECF. Their findings indicated that although contributors are 
not treated by artists as business partners and the artists wanted to be fully independent, 
crowdfunders thought about the commercial side and showed interests in profit of the ventures 
they funded. While some attempts have been made to study the effects of institutions on CF in 
general (Kshetri, 2015), there is little direct research about how various institutions are linked to 
ECF. We argue that this form of CF has important implications for entrepreneurial activities and 
thus needs more research attention. 
 
In addition to research gaps noted above, CF has a potential to bring significant changes in social 
practices and political processes. Especially ECF makes it possible for broad groups of investors 
to fund startup companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in return for equity. 
That is, investors provide money to a business in return of ownership of a part of the company. 
Founders and entrepreneurs can build their brand's loyalty via customer stock ownership (Alois, 
2016c). ECF thus can be considered to be a substitute of VC. ECF is especially important for 
entrepreneurs looking for early-stage investments. This is because established VC firms focus 
more on expansion stage ventures. In the U.S., for instance, in 2015, VC investment in seed stage 
companies accounted for 3% all VC investments and 5% of all deals (nvca.org, 2016). It is thus 
important and timely for regulators, investors, entrepreneurs and other stakeholders to observe 
this rapidly evolving phenomenon and share insights, reflections and observations with each 
other. It is also important for these stakeholders to recognize the forces that are shaping ECF. 
 
The goal of this paper is to fill gaps in the sparse literature on ECF and help relevant 
stakeholders (e.g., regulatory authorities, entrepreneurs, investors, trade associations) take timely 
and informed decisions related to ECF. Specifically it examines the following research 
questions: RQ1: How do informal institutions affect project initiators' willingness to go for an 
ECF instead of other sources of financing?; RQ2: How do informal institutions affect 
crowdfunders' willingness to invest in an ECF project?; RQ3: How do such effects differ across 
ECF and other forms of CF?; RQ4: What factors drive the institutionalization of ECF that may 
lead to an increase in project initiators' willingness to go for an ECF and crowdfunders' 
propensity to engage in ECF? 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first discussing the approach to informal 
institutions used in this paper. Then we discuss the methods employed in the paper. Next, we 
present the findings. It is followed by a section on discussion and implications. The final section 
provides concluding comments. 
 
2. The approach to informal institutions 
 
As defined above institutions are “macro-level rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 27). An 
earliest scholar to write about rules was Black (1962), who identified four different ways rules 
are used: regulations, instructions, precepts, and principles. The rules proposed by North 
(1990) can be viewed as consisting of regulations and precepts. In this way, institutions can be 
considered to be a conceptual subset of the rules defined by Black (1962). Regulations and 
precepts can be broadly mapped to formal and informal institutions respectively. 
 
Ostrom (2005, p. 824) defines institutions as “the rules, norms, …. used by humans in repetitive 
situations”. When used as regulation, rules are something that are “laid down by an authority 
(e.g., a legislature, judge, magistrate, board of directors, university president) as required of 
certain persons (or, alternatively, forbidden or permitted)” (Black, 1962, p. 115). Ostrom (2005, 
p. 831) describes rules as used in the precept sense as “generally accepted moral fabric of a 
community” and “cultural prescriptions”. These are “shared prescriptions known and accepted 
by most of the participants themselves involving intrinsic costs and benefits rather than material 
sanctions or inducements” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 831). Norms encompass a wide range of meanings 
and operate at various levels of the social system. For instance, social norms govern or reflect 
people's expectations of behavior in the entire society (Gouldner, 1960, Williamson, 1993). 
Differentiating from use of rules in the regulation sense, Ostrom (2005, p. 831) notes that “one 
would not speak of enforcing, rescinding, or reinstating a rule in the precept sense”. A precept 
can also be understood as a “maxim for prudential or moral behavior” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 831). 
Certain ECF-related decisions (e.g., engaging in online transaction and helping a stranger) can be 
considered to be practical precepts and are viewed as prudent and/or moral according to a 
particular criterion of success defined in a given cultural setting. 
 
3. Methods 
 
This study utilizes inductive analysis, which involves “approaches that primarily use detailed 
readings of raw data to derive concepts, themes, or a model through interpretations made from 
the raw data by an evaluator or researcher” (Thomas, 2006, p. 238). We took this approach 
because there is a relatively small amount of research involving ECF. Prior researchers have 
suggested that in areas like this, much initial research needs to be qualitative, concept- and 
theory-building in character (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The goal of this study is to summarize raw data and capture key themes, processes, and patterns. 
Thus, the product of the inductive process consists of a model of the ECF phenomenon intended 
to be helpful in organizing further investigation of its components and holistic behaviors. 
 
3.1. Raw data 
 
The data for this study mainly involved articles, blogs (from popular media), reports (e.g., 
Massolution, www.massolution.com/ and consultants (e.g., KPMG, 2014), policy documents 
(e.g., from the World Bank (infoDev)/The World Bank, 2013) and video and audio clips. 
Archival data are among a variety of recognized data sources for academic research (Ansari et 
al., 2015, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 
In order to locate the relevant data, we searched using various combinations of keywords such as 
“equity crowdfunding”, “equity-based crowdfunding”, “culture”, “norms”, etc. Our search 
started with LexisNexis database and Google News. We also included materials from sources 
cited in the news from these two databases such as blogs, news and other online content sites. 
We limited our search to materials published in the English language. At least one direct quote 
from a practitioner in the field was used as a criterion for inclusion. Prior researchers have noted 
that knowledge that is derived from practice or experience is an important source for reasoning 
in the theory-development process (Webster and Watson, 2002). Experiences and practices of 
organizations such as the Brazilian CFP, Kickante, the Latin American CFP, Idea.Me, the 
Japanese CFP, ReadyFor? and India-based CFP Ketto have been used. Blogs, interviews and 
public statements of key decision-makers, policy-makers and related stakeholders involved at CF 
such as Chandan Joshi, Partner at Oliver Wyman, two Vietnamese entrepreneurs who 
crowdfunded the cartoon series, Long Than Tuong, Pauliina Seppälä of the Finnish CFP 
Mesenaatti.me, Sandi Gilbert, Founder & CEO for SeedsUps Canada, Mandy Marahimin, CEO 
of the Indonesian CFP, Wujudkan.com, Gaidar Magdanurov, Investment Director of Russia's 
Runa Capital's Renyung Ho, co-organizer of CreativeMornings Singapore and co-founder of 
Kennel, a co-working space and Italy's Culture, the U.K.-based Internet entrepreneur Paul Birch 
and Tourism Minister Dario Franceschini were also analyzed. 
 
As suggested by prior researchers (Golder, 2000, Mason et al., 1997), we analyzed the sources of 
evidence as well as the evidence by using the criteria suggested by Gottschalk (1969) such as 
time elapsed between events and reporting, openness to corrections, range of knowledge and 
expertise of the person reporting the events, and corroboration from multiple sources. For 
instance, in order to elucidate the relationship between thin trust and propensity to engage in CF 
in Asian economies, we triangulated information from multiple sources (e.g., Dan, 2013, 
ehipnews.com, 2013). Likewise, for arguments related to trust in online transactions in these 
economies, data were matched from Dan (2013) ehipnews.com (2013) and Soh (2013) and cross-
checked. 
 
The relevant materials from various sources resulted in 150 pages of text. The raw data also 
included video and audio recordings of interviews with people experienced in CF. Four videos 
(about 73 min) and 1 audio (about 8 min long) found on news media websites were also used. 
Text–, audio- and video-related materials were included only if they contained at least one 
example that illustrated how CF is affected by informal institutions as defined by Ostrom 
(2005), North (1990) and Scott (2001). 
 
3.2. Data analysis 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that three broad tasks for qualitative data analysis include 
data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusions. Regarding the first step- data reduction-- 
in the inductive approach, Thomas (2006) suggested that researchers describe procedures to 
create meaning in complex raw data by developing summary themes or categories. The 
categories which emerge from the coding of raw data have five key features (Thomas, 2006): a) 
category label: a word or a phrase that refers to the category; b) category description (meaning of 
the category, key characteristics, scope, limitations); c) texts that are associated with the category 
(examples illustrating meanings, associations, and perspectives), d) links (how each category is 
related with other categories); e) the model which embeds the category. 
 
The category labels are represented by the boxes in Fig. 1. We followed the coding process 
suggested by Thomas (2006). We read and reread the text data in order to generate the most 
important categories. Thomas (2006) suggested to create between three and eight categories. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Informal institutions and IECF. 
 
We continuously revised and refined the category system. Under each category, we searched for 
subtopics and conceptual themes within the sub- topics that could provide new insights. As 
suggested by Thomas (2006, p. 242), categories with similar meanings were combined under a 
“superordinate” category. For instance, precepts shared by entrepreneurs and precepts shared by 
investors are “superordinate” categories which include two and three categories respectively as 
presented in Fig. 1. 
 
3.3. Writing the findings 
 
In writing the findings, it is important to include detailed descriptions of the categories that 
emerge from the data and appropriate quotations, which illustrate the categories' meanings 
(Thomas, 2006). To this end, meaning and characteristics of the categories have been explained 
in Table 2. In Table 3, we have provided examples that illustrate particular meanings of the 
categories in specific contexts. This Table presents views of practitioners involved with ECF. 
They have been categorized based on various components of informal institutions. 
 
Table 2. Key categories that emerged from analysis of data and their meanings. 
Category Meaning/explanation 
Stigmatization of 
entrepreneurial failure • The act/process of negatively labelling or characterizing entrepreneurial failure. 
Existence of CF-related 
trade association 
• A CF-related trade association is an organization founded by businesses that operate in 
the CF industry. 
Thin trust • Trust between (or confidence placed in) strangers 
Trust in the Internet • The degree of confidence placed in the Internet's effectiveness as a medium to conduct transactions 
The degree of philanthropic 
involvement 
• A society's altruistic activities that are carried out to improve human welfare and 
advancement. Such activities are often reflected in donations of money and work or use 
of time to help needy persons. 
The existence of regulatory 
framework for ECF 
• Taxes, regulations, rules and institutions that define rights and obligations of parties 
involved in ECF 
ECF market maturity • The state of development of the ECF market. 
 
The final outcome was a model incorporating the most important categories as represented 
in Fig. 1. The constructs and relationships embedded in the model, which are based on insights 
that emerged from raw data themes, together with the testable propositions represent a 
theory3 regarding the relationships among key CF concepts. The letter N and C in parentheses 
represent what Scott (2001) refers to as normative and cognitive institutions respectively. 
 
3.4. The nature of theory developed 
 
Rivard (2014) observed that a theory paper puts less emphasis on the synthesis of prior literature 
and focuses more on theory development. We follow Bacharach's (1989, p. 496) definition of 
theory as a “statement of relations among concepts within a boundary set of assumptions and 
constraints”. Among the five ways identified by Gregor (2006) regarding the use of “theory”, the 
approach of this paper can be described as Type IV–theory for explanation and prediction. We 
explain constructs related to dependent and independent variables, their associations and the 
states covered. Such an approach would help develop a more refined understanding of the 
relationships between informal institutions and ECF and enable reliable and accurate prediction. 
Empirical testing may partly or fully support or refute the theory. 
 
                                                          
3 Following Anderson (1993), we distinguish between theory and a framework in this paper's context as follows: 
Frameworks consist of a set of constructs that define key aspects of and make general claims about ECF and other 
types of CF. Frameworks, however, are not specified sufficiently to enable predictions. Framework do not involve a 
hypothesis-testing research agenda. By adding a series of propositions and the underlying assumptions, we propose a 
theory regarding the relationships among key crowdfunding concepts in order to illuminate the world of 
crowdfunding in a useful way. 
Table 3. Views of some practitioners involved with ECF and other forms of CF. 
Stigmatization of entrepreneurial failure 
The U.K.-based Internet entrepreneur 
Paul Birch 
“In the UK, there is a stigma against business failure among the general public, 
whereas in the US it's almost a badge of honor” (Singleton, 2008). 
Marcus News, Founder & Chief 
Entrepreneur from InvestX 
“Entrepreneurship is not celebrated in Canada the way it is in other countries 
especially the US where there is an ecosystem that supports (it)” (Conkin and 
Cormick, 2015) 
Khanh Duong, who initiated the idea 
of crowdfunding the cartoon series, 
Long Than Tuong and set up the CFP 
for the project 
Commenting on Phong: “At the beginning my main challenge was talking Phong into 
the idea.” The cartoonist [Thanh Phong] was concerned that if the project failed then it 
would affect his reputation (Le, 2015). 
“You need to get over the fear of losing” (Le, 2015). 
Maturity of the ECF market 
Sandi Gilbert, Founder & CEO for 
SeedsUps Canada 
Canadian investor's reluctance to invest in equity CF can be attributed to the relative 
newness of the concept in Canada. More deals are likely to increase investor interest 
(Conkin and Cormick, 2015). 
Chandan Joshi, Partner at Oliver 
Wyman 
“When it comes to Asia, the concept of crowdfunding is very new and visionary. It 
also might require some business model innovations” (Tan, 2014). 
ECF legislation 
An official of South Korean CFP, 
Wadiz 
“The biggest complaint we get from our [ECF] investors is that they can't invest in 
another venture because they maxed out on their limits. This must be resolved by 
modifying the related regulations” (Jang, 2017). 
Philanthropy 
Italy's Culture and Tourism Minister 
Dario Franceschini 
“Bringing the culture of patronage here [in Italy] will take time” (Williams, 2015). 
Pauliina Seppälä of the Finnish CFP 
Mesenaatti.me 
“We want to make sure we benefit the Finnish culture, society and economy. We don't 
take on projects that do not somehow add to the common good, like a new innovation 
or work of art. Our social system already funds culture, social projects and also 
innovations, so it is already a sort of crowdfunding system, where people put money 
together to fund important things”. (David, 2013) 
Chandan Joshi, Partner at Oliver 
Wyman 
“… a purely rewards based crowdfunding model, which is the name of the game today, 
in the future might give way to equity-based models, which may be more in line with 
the investor expectation of returns in Asia.” (Tan, 2014) 
Trust in online transactions 
Mandy Marahimin, CEO of the 
Indonesian CFP, Wujudkan.com 
“…. a lot of Indonesians still have yet to trust the Internet to facilitate financial 
transactions” (ehipnews.com, 2013, para. 2). 
Renyung Ho, co-organizer of 
CreativeMornings Singapore and co-
founder of Kennel, a co-working 
space 
“One problem we faced as project creators was that some of our pledge supporters 
were not comfortable with providing credit card details to an unknown site. Many were 
also not familiar with using PayPal. Instead, we got more supporters pledging money 
through bank transfers and cheque deposits” (Soh, 2013, para. 18). 
Thin trust 
Gaidar Magdanurov, Russia-based 
Runa Capital's Investment Director 
“People want to be part of something constructive and have the money to do it. But the 
level of mutual mistrust here is higher, so crowdfunding will take longer to gain a 
foothold in Russia” (Avshalumova, 2013, para. 4). 
Ma Jinxin, a businessman from 
Beijing, China 
“… we tend to become suspicious about any stranger who asks for help because we 
were taught to do so at school and at home. When we see people begging on the street, 
the first thought that occurs to us is that they are cheaters” (Dan, 2013). 
CF-related trade associations 
The German Crowdfunding 
Association 
Commenting on the law regulating CF in Germany, Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz (Small 
Investor Protection Act): “We want that investors with larger disposable income be 
able to freely use crowdfunding platforms in Germany, as they can already do in other 
countries” (Torris, 2016c) 
NCFA Canada Commenting on the effect of CF on the economy and society: CF is “creating jobs, 
spurring growth in start-ups and scale-ups, and providing investment opportunities for 
those who were previously shut out from such ventures. We're witnessing the dawn of 
a new economic phenomenon that is rapidly changing how consumers and businesses 
aggregate, transfer, store and invest capital privately” (Alois, 2017) 
 
 
As noted above, the purpose of this paper is to develop a theory for explaining the relationship 
between informal institutions and ECF. Specifically, we are concerned with the relationships that 
exist between various concepts associated with ECF and informal institutions. When the goal of 
a theory is explaining, concepts are at the center of the literature review. That is, the literature 
review moves away from paper-centric or author-centric approaches (Rowe, 2014, Webster and 
Watson, 2002). 
 
The focus of the literature review in this paper is on understanding ECF (related to dependent 
variables), through related concepts (independent variables). In such a situation, a narrative style 
is desirable to make sense of the contents of the literature (Rowe, 2014). 
 
It is important to specify the boundary conditions related to a theory's assumptions (Bacharach, 
1989, Rivard, 2014). Whetten (2002) suggested to consider two types of assumptions: conceptual 
and contextual. Conceptual assumptions or “second order explanations” are the “implicit whys 
underlying an explicit answer to a specific why question” (p. 58). A foundational theory in this 
paper is institutional theory. A key assumption institutional theorists make is that institutional 
actors seek legitimacy instead of efficiency (Campbell, 2004) and that they “accept and follow 
social norms” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996, p. 176). 
 
Contextual assumptions specify a theory's boundary. These assumptions determine the 
conditions that circumscribe the explanation proposed by the theory (Whetten, 2002). The idea is 
that a theory covers only a particular class or state of things (Weber, 2012). According to Sutton 
and Staw (1995, p. 376), in a strong theory, it is possible to “discern conditions in which the 
major proposition or hypothesis is most and least likely to hold”. Contextual assumptions explain 
when, where, and for whom the theory holds (Whetten, 2002). The contextual boundary of the 
model presented in this paper comprises the IECF, the processes of raising and investing in 
IECF, and the informal institutions in which the fundraisers and investors are embedded. The 
context does not include other types of fundraising activities or raising funds offline. Moreover, 
the proposed associations among the various constructs are expected to be positive or negative 
on a ceteris paribus basis. This means that for each proposed relationship, other forces may be at 
work that might neutralize or overturn the otherwise expected positive or negative relationship. 
 
4. Findings 
 
The findings are organized in three sections. First, we provide an analysis of the precepts shared 
by entrepreneurs that may serve to guide their engagement in efforts to raise IECF. Then, we 
discuss the precepts that are likely to be embodied in potential investors' norms and values. 
Finally, we look at the factors that drive the institutionalization of IECF. 
 
4.1. Factors shaping the precepts shared by entrepreneurs 
 
4.1.1. Social interpretation of business failure and ECF 
 
The project initiators, Thanh Phong, a popular Vietnamese cartoonist and illustrator, and his 
friend Khanh Duong, who successfully raised CF to the new cartoon series, Long Than Tuong 
(The Dragon General) noted that crowdfunders who funded their project showed a high level of 
interest and curiosity in the project (Table 3). Why would this be the case? Extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations impact behaviors of ECF investors. They may track the progress, status and 
outcomes of the projects. This means that crowdfunders are likely to notice success as well as 
failure more keenly and comment in social media and other channels. The more a failure is 
visible, the higher the level of perceived humiliation for an entrepreneur whose project has 
received ECF. The “intrinsic costs” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 831) of failure are high for entrepreneurs. 
 
Societies differ in their orientation toward failure. According to the EY G20 Entrepreneurship 
Barometer 2013, in the G20 economies, only about a quarter viewed business failure as an 
opportunity to learn compared to 43% in U.S. (Ey.com, 2013). 
 
An important point about entrepreneurial failure needs to be made here. In most other financing 
models, only a few experienced investors know about the failure and a failed entrepreneur's 
social dignity will not be threatened. Whereas in most other financing model, it is typically the 
corporation's money, crowdfunders typically include private individuals, who invest their 
personal money. A success or failure is thus publicly observed. It is argued that the public 
exposure of crowdfunding is likely to discourage “humiliation-averse entrepreneurs” from 
participating (ST, 2016). For instance, some describe China's culture as “success-obsessed” 
which is incompatible with the prevalence of failure in startup ventures (ST, 2016). Thus 
intrinsic costs of failures vary across societies with different degree of stigmatization of failure. 
 
Brzozowska and Gałuszka (2015) found that relations among artists and users were characterized 
by equality, and that the user community had a collective influence on artists. Their findings also 
indicated that although contributors are not treated by artists as business partners and the artists 
wanted to be fully independent, crowdfunders thought about the commercial side and showed 
interests in profit of the ventures they funded. This phenomenon can be better examined and 
understood by looking at crowdfunders' extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Each type of CF 
would prompt potential crowdfunders to respond with their individual combinations of 
motivations. An individual's combination of motivations is an interaction of the individual and 
CF. Each CF type thus may tend to attract those of different combinations of motivations 
unequally but systematically. 
 
The theory of intrinsic motivation is based on the premise that human need for competence and 
self-determination are linked with interest and enjoyment (Deci and Ryan, 1985). According 
to Ryan and Deci (2000), intrinsically motivated individuals do activities for “inherent 
satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence”. There is no external pressures or 
rewards involved. For instance, in donation-based CF, donors are mostly intrinsically motivated 
and make payments to the causes they are passionate about. 
 
On the other hand, while some crowdfunders investing in ECF may have some degree of 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., helping entrepreneurs), they are mostly extrinsically or financially 
motivated. Extrinsic motivations can be better explained by economic theory, which suggests 
that human behavior is a result of “incentives applied from outside the person (Frey, 1997, p. 
13). The benefits accruing to the individual may be immediate or delayed. 
 
The amount of financial incentives and the strength of motivation driving an investor's behavior 
co-vary positively. ECF often involves higher amount of money compared to other forms of CF. 
For instance, during 2012–2014, the average fund size in Kickstarter (reward-based CFP) was 
US$7825 compared to US$500,000 in SeedInvest (ECFP) (Feit, 2015). Individuals who invest in 
ECF are thus likely to be extrinsically/financially motivated and a higher investment leads to 
stronger motivation. 
 
In sum, prior research suggests that the stigma of failure is tightly linked to entrepreneurial 
activities (Landier, 2005). The mechanisms are of particular importance in ECF because 
entrepreneurs who receive ECF and fail are likely to face a higher degree of humiliation than 
those that receive funding from other sources. It is thus proposed that: 
 
P1. Ceteris paribus, the degree of stigmatization of entrepreneurial failure in a society is 
negatively related to entrepreneurs' willingness to raise funds via IECFPs compared to other 
financing sources. 
 
4.1.2. CF-related trade associations 
 
As direct quotes from CF-related associations indicate, these associations are helping relevant 
stakeholders understand the impact of ECF and pushing regulators to adopt more ECF-friendly 
policies (Table 3). These associations do not lay down rules that entrepreneurs are required to 
follow. They, however, actively engage in training and coaching to ensure that entrepreneurs 
understand ECF. Such activities may increase entrepreneurs' “intrinsic benefits” (Ostrom, 2005, 
p. 831) of engaging in ECF. 
 
Table 4. Some examples of CF-related associations and samples of activities to stimulate ECF. 
CF association Sample of activities 
The U.K. Crowdfunding 
Association (UKCFA) 
Partnered with Crowdfest, a “multi-streamed forum” to address topics such as blending CF 
with VC and angel investment, exploiting cross-national opportunities and making a 
successful exit. Topics covered also included combining ECF with Islamic finance (Alois, 
2016a). 
The African Crowdfunding 
Association (ACFA) 
Lobbies for legislation and increase public awareness on CF. its goal is to educate the public, 
policymakers about the benefits of CF (Jackson, 2015). It also aims to protect investors and 
democratize access to capital (Gilbert, 2015). 
The Association of French 
crowdfunding platforms, 
Financement Participatif France 
Organizes events in which participants from traditional and alternative finance attend. The 
3rd annual meeting held in March 2016 had about 500 participants, in which the French 
Minister of Economy was the main speaker. The Minister announced several improvements 
in French ECF regulations (Torris, 2016b). 
Nordic Crowdfunding Alliance 
(NCA) 
It helps potential investors and donors to identify opportunities beyond national borders and 
across the whole Nordic area. Project owners can decide whether to focus campaigns 
nationally or broaden to the Nordic region (Clawson, 2014). 
Danish crowdfunding 
Association (DCA) 
Lobbies for regulatory changes in Danish law to properly legalize ECF (NCA, 2016). It aims 
to promote ECF as a financing form for entrepreneurs in Denmark (De Stefano, 2016). It has 
been working with relevant stakeholders to reproduce best practices and successes from the 
U.K. and other European countries (Alois, 2014). 
 
Table 4 provides additional details from CF-related trade associations in other economies that are 
instructive regarding the diverse mechanisms and approaches used to overcome various barriers 
and to stimulate the growth of the ECF industry and market. They include dealing with issues of 
CF-related etiquette and ethics, boosting the confidence of entrepreneurs, increasing awareness 
and education (UKCFA) and cross-border opportunities (e.g., NCA) and helping to reproduce 
best practices and successes from foreign countries (e.g., DCA). 
 
The National Crowdfunding Association of Canada educates entrepreneurs and other fundraisers 
in proper etiquette and ethics related to CF (CBCNews, 2016). The NCAC helps set fundraisers 
expectations correctly. If expectations are met or exceeded, entrepreneurs will be inclined to use 
ECF for future fundraising. 
 
As noted earlier, national legal systems related to ECF are not well developed in most countries. 
In general in nascent and formative sectors such as ECF, there is no developed network of 
regulatory agencies comparable to those in established sectors (Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009). As 
a consequence, there is no stipulated template developed for organizing institutional actors' 
behaviors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Trade associations are in a position to provide some 
degree of institutional co-ordination in order to overcome the existing regulatory gap in ECF and 
initiated steps to improve the ECF ecosystem. 
 
While prior research has shown that trade associations play a key role in the development of the 
CF industry and market in general (Kshetri, 2015), they are more motivated and interested in 
stimulating the growth of ECF and supporting entrepreneurial activities. For instance, one of the 
goals of the European Crowdfunding Network is to support entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 2015). 
Similarly, the National Crowdfunding Association of the U.S. represents the interests of investor 
as well as the entrepreneur in ECF. In the same vein, membership in the National Crowdfunding 
Association of India is open to entrepreneurs. 
 
Especially in emerging economies, trade associations replace the roles that are often played by 
consultancy firms in filling the institutional voids (Back et al., 2014). Several mechanisms can be 
proposed regarding the roles of trade associations in enriching the ECF ecosystem (Table 4). For 
instance, they can find ways to develop the talents and special abilities needed for the ECF. They 
can train entrepreneurs to write quality proposals, which can pass all the steps successfully and 
raise the targeted funds. They can help entrepreneurs develop and implement effective 
advertising campaigns for CF projects. 
 
As is the case of the ACFA (Table 4), trade associations may engage in lobbying to convince 
policy makers to introduce ECF legislations. Influencing ECF regulations has been a major goal 
of National Crowdfunding Association of India as well (Alois, 2013). 
 
Prior researchers have noted that such associations constitute the “most elaborate and intricate 
organizational arrangements” (Scott, 1992, p. 253) and play a significant role in legitimating 
institutional changes (Greenwood et al., 2002). The examples above provide mechanisms that are 
specific to ECF. The discussion in this section is summarized as: 
 
P2. Ceteris paribus, the existence of CF-related trade associations is positively related to 
entrepreneurs' (a) ability and (b) willingness to raise IECF. 
 
4.2. Factors shaping the precepts shared by investors 
 
4.2.1. Thin trust 
 
Online ECF involves fundraising efforts often initiated by a stranger. What is important here is 
thin trust between strangers rather than thick trust between people that know each other. In Latin 
America trust mainly resides within the” jus sanguinis” (“the right of blood”). Latin Americans 
thus lack trust in unknown people (Lagos, 2001). 
 
The CEO of the Indonesian CFP, Wujudkan.com noted that Indonesians are less comfortable in 
trusting a stranger (ehipnews.com, 2013). This phenomenon can be explained with thin trust 
(Table 2). Issues related to thin trust arise as we look at some of the concerns expressed by other 
practitioners such as Gaidar Magdanurov, Runa Capital's Investment Director makes it clear that 
the lack of thin trust has been a major obstacle facing ECF in Russia (Table 3). Note that trust 
indices for Indonesia and Russia are 16.9 and 55.4 respectively compared to Norway's 148 
(Medrano, 2016). In the same vein, Arab consumers arguably are suspicious and convincing 
them to invest in an ECF project is not easy (Khalil, 2013). 
 
Prior research suggests that economic decisions are shaped by social behaviors (Lai et al., 2014). 
A related concept is social capital as defined by Putnam (1993, p. 167) as “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions”. The degree of social trust among community members is a key 
component of social capital (Coleman, 1988). 
 
As Table 1 shows, ECF per capita in the LAC is among the lowest. One key observation 
regarding the slow takeoff of ECF in LAC is that the liberalization of markets and economic 
modernization led to the disbandment of social networks. Whereas these disappearing networks 
have been replaced by new forms of support systems (e.g., voluntary associations in the U.S.) 
such systems have not yet emerged in Latin America. Latin American economies thus consist of 
“lonely populations” who lack social support and links (Lagos, 2001). The trust index of Brazil 
was 17.5 compared to Norway's 148 (Medrano, 2016).4  
 
A low social trust has hindered the development of ECF in China. According to a study of the 
Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, family members are viewed 
as the most trustworthy in China, which is followed by close friends and acquaintances. Only 
30% of participants in the study trusted strangers on the street and only 24% trusted strangers 
online (Dan, 2013). We propose that: 
 
P3. Ceteris paribus, a high degree of thin trust between strangers is positively related to 
individuals' propensity to invest in IECF. 
 
4.2.2. Trust in online transactions 
 
As Renyung Ho, co-organizer of CreativeMornings Singapore and co-founder of Kennel, a co-
working space has noted problems related to credit cards use online has been a barrier faced by 
the ECF industry and market in Singapore (Table 3). This factor has arguably slowed down 
ECF's take off in Singapore. The CEO of the Indonesian CFP, Wujudkan.com, Mandy 
                                                          
4 Trust index = 100 + % (Most people can be trusted) − % (You can never be too careful when dealing with others). 
Marahimin echoed this sentiment (Table 3). Many researchers (e.g., Kshetri, 2015) as well as 
practitioners have emphasized the roles of trust in online transaction on the success of ECF. 
 
It is important to understand cognitive programs that are built on mental maps of potential 
crowdfunders and project initiators. Put differently, cognitive systems influence the lens through 
crowdfunders and project initiators view ECF (Scott, 2001). An important aspect of potential CF 
investors' mental maps concerns attitudes toward CFPs, especially the degree of trust that 
potential investors place on CFPs. For instance, consumers in many Asian economies are 
characterized by an unfavorable attitude toward online transactions. One of the explanations put 
forward for this attitude is that in Asian economies such as Vietnam personal business 
relationships play an important role. Potential investors are thus less likely to invest online in a 
stranger's business (Fintechnews, 2016). In these economies, the lack of a sizable market of early 
adopters comfortable with supporting IECF has hindered the growth of the market. 
 
A further challenge in China is that commercial organizations such as CFPs are less trusted. 
According to the study of the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
discussed above, when the respondents were asked to name institutions that they trusted, 69% 
said government, 64% chose public media, 58% selected non-governmental organizations, only 
52% named commercial organizations (Dan, 2013). The line of argument developed above leads 
us to the suggestion that for people in many Asian economies, transacting online is against their 
principles of prudent behavior. 
 
A final point that should be stressed is that while there is some overlapping between trust in 
online transactions and thin trust because both involve dealing primarily with strangers, prior 
research suggests that some differences between these two concepts exist. Trust is tightly linked 
to perceived risk (Mayer et al., 1995). Platform enabling online transactions such as CFPs 
involve risks that are unique to such platforms. For instance, consumers may be concerned about 
functionalities of a website to provide the services that the site claims to provide or it may 
require more time, efforts, money and other resources (Gefen et al., 2008). Consumers may also 
be concerned about potential misuse of information involved in an e-commerce transaction 
(Kshetri, 2014a). In sum, we argue that: 
 
P4. Ceteris paribus, the degree of trust in online transactions is positively related to individuals' 
propensity to invest in IECF. 
 
4.2.3. Philanthropy 
 
From the quotes of Italy's Culture and Tourism Minister and Oliver Wyman Partner Chandan 
Joshi, it is clear that the lack of philanthropic support has hindered the growth of some forms of 
non-ECF, especially donation-based CF in Italy and some Asian economies. On the other hand, 
the quote from Pauliina Seppälä of Mesenaatti.me indicates a favorable 
philanthropic environment in Finland. 
 
We noted above that different types of CF are related to different combinations of motivations. It 
is important to look at factors that lead to motivation and commitment to contributing and 
investing in different types of CF. In this regard, a point to be noted will be that social capital has 
far broader implications than just the production of thin trust. 
 
Different elements of social capital have different social, political and economic outcomes. 
Especially the social norm component of social capital, which is related to obligations and 
expectations of support among community members, normally outside the family and ethnic 
group, deserves emphasis (Coleman, 1988, Coleman, 1993). 
 
Social norm is a key determinant of whether, and how much people give (Radley and Kennedy, 
1995). A relevant concept is philanthropy, which can be viewed as a social relationship in which 
donors and recipients engage in projects that have mutual and shared interests (Ostrander, 2007). 
Philanthropic involvement, which is defined as the degree to which people voluntarily allocate 
time, money and other resources to charitable, social and humanitarian initiatives and activities 
(Ricks and Williams, 2005) is linked to the success of a donation- or reward-based CF project. 
 
A CF project involving social or philanthropic purpose such as donations for charity is more 
likely to be successful in societies with a sense of social obligation. Also in a reward-based CF, 
crowdfunders may be more interested in social or psychological benefits rather than monetary 
return. Philanthropy and benevolence are more likely to affect reward- and donation-based CF 
projects than those motivated by economic returns such as ECF (Kshetri, 2015). 
 
People in some societies demonstrate a weak socio-cultural orientation toward CF projects. For 
instance, the lack of civic and psychological orientations and the lack of training have hindered 
the development of the Arab CF industry (Khalil, 2013). Compared to the West, the Arab society 
is characterized by a low degree of social capital (Atiyyah, 1992). 
 
Fig. 2 presents differences in the distribution of ECF and non-ECF (NECF) in the U.K., France 
and China. ECF's relative share in China is higher than in France or the U.K. Why might this be 
the case? Note that compared to other CF types, investing in ECF is often more about expecting 
a future return on investment. A country characterized by a lower degree of philanthropic 
involvement is likely to exhibit a higher relative preference for ECF than NCEF. 
 
 
Fig. 2. An illustration of the distribution (%) of non-loan CF in the U.K., France and China. 
 
It is a common practice for the cultural heritage sector to raise funds through donations, 
philanthropy and sponsorship, which are not associated with an expected financial return. In the 
cultural heritage sector, crowdfunders invest due to their “personal desire to support the 
development and realization of a project that in some way is meaningful to the contributor” 
(CMF, 2012). CF in cultural heritage is relatively new outside North America and Europe. One 
indicator to understand the cross-cultural heterogeneity in generosity and propensity to help a 
stranger or volunteer time is the Charities Aid Foundation's World Giving Index (WGI). WGI for 
2014 was based on Gallup survey of 135 nations. The survey asked whether the respondents had 
given money to charity, volunteered or helped a stranger. The WGI for 2014 varied from the 
lowest of 14% for Yemen to the highest of 64% for the U.S. and Myanmar (CAF, 2014). 
 
Consider India, which ranked at 69 (WGI: 29%). According to the survey, only 39% of Indians 
gave money to charities, 21% volunteered time and 38% helped a stranger (CAF, 2014). Some 
observers note that people in India care less about social causes and are less likely to offer 
money if there is no financial or monetary return (Chaudhary, 2013). For instance, Mumbai-
based CFP for social, personal and creative projects, Ketto was reported to raise US$700,000 in 
funding. Most funders, however, were celebrities and corporations (Sainul, 2015). Likewise, 
India's ice hockey players wanted to take part in an International Ice Hockey tournament 
Challenge Cup held in Kuwait in April 2015. The 25-member team raised about US$32,000, of 
which 80% was contributed by three business groups (bbc.com, 2015). Thus, the funds are not 
coming from the crowd in the real sense. 
 
Individuals' engagement in philanthropic activities especially determine the success of donation-
based CF. For instance, a study conducted in Poland indicated that a higher proportion of 
respondents were motivated by helping artists rather than return on investment (Galuszka and 
Bystro, 2012). Moreover, the degree to which people support a reward-based CF may be driven 
predominantly by a philanthropic motive rather than an interest in the reward (Kshetri, 2015). 
 
Overall, societies characterized by a high tendency to voluntarily allocate time, money and other 
resources to charitable, social and humanitarian initiatives provide a supportive environment for 
the success of reward- and donation-based CF projects. 
 
EU-Eastern Partnership Culture and Creativity Program lists several European CFPs working for 
the development of culture projects (Culturepartnership.eu, 2015). It is, however, reported that 
attempts to raise CF to renovate dozens of cultural sites damaged throughout Italy have been 
unsuccessful. The lower success rate can be attributed to a lower patrimony and philanthropic 
support among Italians compared to other EU countries (Williams, 2015). 
 
To illustrate the above argument with real-world examples, in Table 5, we compare different 
types of CF in three countries with different WGI ranks: China, France and the U.K. Note that 
we compare ECF as a proportion of total non-loan CF instead of absolute amounts of different 
types of CF. While the data correspond to different years for the three countries, the differences 
in years do not matter as much for the proportion as they do for absolute amounts of CF. As it is 
clear from Table 5, a country that performs poorer in the WGI is likely to have a higher ECF as a 
proportion of total non-loan CF. 
 
Table 5. A comparison of IECF and Internet-based NECF in the U.K., France and China.  
The U.K. 
(2013) 
France 
(2015) 
China 
(2014H1) 
ECF (million, US$) 45 55.83 25.4 
Rewards + Donation CF (million, US$) 529 55.72 5.2 
Total non-loan CF (million, US$) 574 111.56 30.6 
ECF as a proportion of total non-loan CF (%) 7.84 50.05 83.01 
WGI rank (2015) (a lower number indicates a higher propensity of giving) 6 74 144 
Data sources: France (Alois, 2016b), China Zhang et al. (2014), the U.K. (Kshetri, 2015. 
 
In sum, in a society characterized by a low degree of philanthropic involvement, there is likely to 
be a higher relative propensity to engage in ECF compared to other forms of CF. The above 
leads to the following: 
 
P5. Ceteris paribus, the degree of philanthropic involvement is positively related to the ratio of 
Internet-based NECF to IECF. 
 
4.3. Institutionalization of IECF 
 
4.3.1. ECF legislation and enforcement 
 
As reported by an official of the South Korean CFP, Wadiz, potential ECF investors express a 
negative orientation toward ECF due to unfavorable ECF legislation. The existence of a clear 
ECF-related regulations and their enforcement can thus reduce uncertainty, and increase the 
predictability that entrepreneurs and other actors in the ECF ecosystem face. Clear regulations 
can help an entrepreneur get supports from investors and other key players. For instance, players 
in the value chain are less constrained by concerns about breaking the law. A related point is that 
well-developed regulative institutions can help improve the quality of CF proposals. An ECF 
proposal that contains clear articulation regarding the compliance with CF-related regulatory 
requirements can be more convincing and trustworthy and attract investors and funders (Kshetri, 
2014b, Kshetri, 2015). Overall ECF laws can increase trust in the value chain. 
 
Nonetheless, a point to be noted is that ECF-related regulative institutions consist of much more 
than relevant laws. A key problem that may limit the development of the ECF market, especially 
in many developing countries, is the substantial gap between the law on the books and the law in 
action. Indeed, unenforced laws may even have the opposite effect. Thus the establishment of 
effective enforcement mechanisms should be a major priority for policy makers. 
 
Prior researchers have suggested that formal and informal institutions affect each other (Axelrod, 
1997, Hayek, 1979). Axelrod (1997, p. 61) comments: “Social norms and laws are often 
mutually supporting. This is true because social norms can become formalized into laws and 
because laws provide external validation of norms”. To put things in context, legislations can 
bring changes through which entrepreneurs gradually place increasing importance on ECF and 
potential crowdfunders develop favorable attitudes toward investing in ECF. 
 
To better understand the associated mechanisms by which formal institutions impact informal 
institutions, we can look at thin trust. If ECF laws exist, potential investors are less likely to feel 
the need to be careful when dealing with project initiators. Investors are less likely to be 
concerned that fundraisers will take advantage of them and run away with their money. That is, 
investors can feel confident that their money will be safe (Britton, 2016). 
 
Some countries with ECF regulations have also established specific legislative mechanisms to 
ensure that investors are protected. For instance, following the ECF legislation in Malaysia, 
businesses that raise ECF are required to appoint a licensed trustee, who holds and administers 
the funds during the CF offer period (Chan, 2015). Overall ECF laws at least partly compensate 
for the lack of thin trust. 
 
A caveat must be included regarding the effects of formal institutions on informal institutions. 
Although ECF legislation affects ECF, practitioners have emphasized the time lag. That is, ECF 
legislation may take time to bring its fruit. In countries outside North America, it reportedly took 
at least two years to have an impact after ECF legislation was adopted (Conkin and Cormick, 
2015). The above leads to the following: 
 
P6. The Existence of ECF friendly legislation and enforcement leads to a higher degree of 
institutionalization of IECF, which increases: a) entrepreneurs' ability and willingness to engage 
in efforts to raise IECF compared to other types of entrepreneurial financing; b) investors' 
propensity to invest in IECF. 
 
4.3.2. The amount of ECF-related activities 
 
Sandi Gilbert of SeedsUps Canada and Chandan Joshi of Oliver Wyman noted that due to 
newness ECF-related norms have not been established. Prior research has shown that in a mature 
market, investors have a clear understanding of the nature and evolution of the markets, and 
related economic and institutional conditions (Chin et al., 2006). A mature ECF market in which 
more activities related to ECF have taken place, diverse participants with different views and 
motivations and different types of links among them are likely to exist. 
 
In some countries CFPs are taking measures that can deter a party from engaging in 
opportunistic behaviors. In March 2015, JD, China's second-biggest e-commerce company, 
launched an ECF platform. JD.com ensures that potential investors meet its strict requirements, 
which include real-name registration (Bischoff, 2015). In mature ECF markets, alternative trust-
producing mechanisms are likely to evolve. 
 
The maturity CF is positively related to the existence of successful ECF projects. They are likely 
to attract media attention and energize entrepreneurs. These features may not exist in an 
immature market. For instance, as noted earlier, in Canada, the lack of education, success stories 
and media attention on ECF is related to Canadian investors' lower willingness to participate in 
ECF (Conkin and Cormick, 2015). 
 
To take an example, in Belgium, a lack of high quality projects has been emphasized as the main 
barrier to the growth of ECF (KPMG, 2014). A significant proportion of entrepreneurs lacked 
awareness of ECF. A large proportion of those who were aware of this financing option 
considered ECF to be “unrealistic, complex with a small chance of success” (KPMG, 2014, p. 9). 
Likewise, most potential investors lacked awareness or knowledge of ECF to consider it to be an 
attractive investment option (KPMG, 2014). 
 
When the ECF market becomes more mature, the challenges can be overcome. In a mature 
market, CFPs also play an instrumental role in provide training and education pertinent to the 
successful launch of ECF. For instance, in Brazil, the CFP Kickante provides coaching and 
guidance to help potential entrepreneurs market a CF campaign. It provides personalized training 
in CF techniques and marketing ideas before and after the launch of a CF project. The company 
has set up a YouTube channel for CF campaign videos. The company also hosts webinars on 
fundraising and CF topics. It also provides administrative help (Davis, 2015). 
 
Seo and Creed (2002) observed that “legitimacy that undermines functional inefficiency” leads 
to institutional changes. If there are some examples of successful ECF projects with high payoff 
and rewards (functional/economic efficiency of ECF), potential investors may consider trusting 
strangers as prudent and legitimate behaviors. Likewise, training, education, coaching and other 
types of support (e.g., initiated by CFPs such as Kickante and trade associations such as NCAC) 
increase potential entrepreneurs' self-confidence, and develop skills to engage in ECF. 
Individuals with a higher degree of self-confidence are likely to perceive ECF environment more 
favorably (higher degree of functional efficiency of ECF) and consider ECF to be legitimate and 
effective. 
 
The above phenomenon can be explained with institutional field. For the ECF, relevant field 
members include national governments, industry bodies, trade and professional associations, 
CFPs, entrepreneurs, investors and other sources of funding, these actors and interactions among 
them are thickening the institutional field formed around ECF. These members and other 
components of the ECF ecosystem (e.g., laws, regulations) are shaped and affected by various 
elements of informal institutions. For instance, there is a significant trend toward collaboration, 
coordination and communication among various ECF-related actors. There is thus a formation of 
a dense network of relationships among various actors in the institutional field formed around 
ECF. By facilitating the exchange of ideas and experience and other mechanisms, such networks 
reduce incentives for opportunism (Axelrod and Cohen, 2001, Kshetri, 2013). In line with these 
arguments, the following proposition is presented: 
 
P7. A higher amount of IECF-related activities in a market leads to a higher degree of 
institutionalization of IECF, which increases: a) entrepreneurs' ability and willingness to engage 
in efforts to raise IECF compared to other types of entrepreneurial financing; b) investors' 
propensity to invest in IECF. 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
 
While prior research emphasized the importance of formal institutions in shaping the 
development of ECF, suggesting that this form of CF tends to be more regulated by the 
governments (Kshetri, 2015), the above discussion suggests that informal institutions are also 
tightly linked to the development of ECF. Let us start this section with the research questions 
that we wanted to address (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Revisiting the research questions. 
Research question Findings and associated propositions Implications 
RQ1: Informal 
institutions' effect on 
project initiators' 
willingness to engage in 
ECF. 
• Perceptions of stigma and humiliation associated with 
business failure lead to project initiators' low degree of 
willingness to go for CF compared to other forms of 
conventional financing (P1) 
• Trade associations can enrich the ECF ecosystem by 
facilitating the development of talents and special abilities, 
training entrepreneurs to write quality ECF proposals, and 
developing/implementing effective advertising campaigns. 
Efforts are continuously being made by these associations 
to increase awareness and provide education to 
entrepreneurs and investors (P2). 
• Governments need to encourage trade 
associations and similar collective 
bodies to organize the development of 
ECF. 
• Governments, CFPs and other relevant 
actors need to initiate efforts against the 
stigma of business failure (e.g., 
education to change negative 
perceptions of entrepreneurial failures) 
and to address the sources of business 
failure. 
• CFPs, in collaboration with other 
relevant actors, should engage in 
broader efforts to educate, train, inform, 
promote and raise awareness of ECF 
among entrepreneurs and investors. 
They should also encourage 
entrepreneurs to engage and individuals 
to invest in ECF. 
RQ2: Effect on 
crowdfunders' 
willingness to invest in 
ECF 
• Institutions characterized by the lack of thin trust and the 
lack of trust in online transactions lead to potential 
crowdfunders' unwillingness to invest in ECF (P3 and P4). 
• ECF legislation and its enforcement 
can compensate for and minimize the 
effects of thin trust. Governments can 
increase the level of social trust by 
punishing people who are engaged in 
scams. A well-regulated online 
marketplace can strengthen investor 
protections. 
RQ3: Difference of 
effects across ECF and 
other forms of CF 
• Institutions that do not promote philanthropic involvement 
lead to a higher ratio of ECF to other forms of CF 
compared to institutions that promote philanthropy. 
Individuals are more likely to be driven by economic and 
financial considerations rather than altruistic and 
philanthropic motives (P5). 
• In such markets more focus and 
attention need to be directed toward the 
development of ECF market rather than 
other those for donation- or reward-
based CF. 
RQ4: Factors driving the 
institutionalization of 
ECF 
• In markets that are more mature (P7) and have ECF 
legislation (P6), project initiators are more willing to engage 
in ECF and crowdfunders are likely to exhibit higher 
propensity to invest in ECF. 
• Enactment and enforcement of ECF 
laws can stimulate the development of 
the ECF market. 
• ECF market maturity can be further 
enhanced relevant institutional actors' 
efforts and initiatives noted above in 
RQ1. 
 
Regarding RQ1, the perceptions of stigma and humiliation associated with business failure 
reduce project initiators' willingness engaged in ECF. The failure of an ECF-funded business is 
more visible and more likely to be noticed. In the U.S., in addition to the fact that business 
failure rate is lower than most other parts of the world, failure is not regarded as a stigma. This 
has been a favorable condition for the ECF. 
 
The existence of CF-related trade associations is likely to lead to conditions that would result in 
entrepreneurs' higher degree of ability and willingness to engage in ECF. Trade associations can 
enrich the ECF ecosystem by helping to develop the talents and special abilities, train 
entrepreneurs to write quality ECF proposals and develop and implement effective advertising 
campaigns. Efforts are continuously being made by such bodies to increase awareness and 
provide education to entrepreneurs and investors. A related point is that strong individual 
entrepreneurs may be necessary for strong CF-related trade associations that provide support and 
guidance to entrepreneurs and investors by offering specialized training, education, know-how 
and information related to CF. These mechanisms are likely to strengthen entrepreneurial skills, 
attitudes and competencies and thus form a virtuous cycle of ECF ecosystem. A deterioration in 
any of the components, on the other hand, is likely to lead to a vicious cycle. 
 
As to RQ2, the lack of thin trust and the lack of trust in online transactions are some of the key 
factors that explain potential crowdfunders' unwillingness to invest in ECF. For instance, 
inadequate and unsupportive informal institutions can be attributed to the underdeveloped ECF 
markets in some economies. LAC economies have among the lowest trust indices, which 
explains their underperformance in ECF. Despite Asia's economic and technological leadership, 
CF has been slow to take off in the region. Informal institutions are likely to play a more 
prominent role in the absence of CF-related regulations. 
 
Regarding RQ3, in a society characterized by a low degree of philanthropic involvement, 
potential crowdfunders exhibit a higher relative propensity to engage in ECF compared to other 
forms of CF. Individuals in such societies are more likely to be driven by economic and financial 
considerations rather than altruistic and philanthropic motives. 
 
Related to RQ4, the above discussion indicates that in an ECF market characterized by the 
existence of ECF legislation and a high degree of maturity, project initiators are more willing to 
pursue ECF and crowdfunders are likely to have a higher relative propensity to engage in ECF. 
ECF legislation can compensate for and minimize the effect of thin trust. Likewise, in a mature 
market dense networks of organizations are likely to develop a higher degree of trust between 
CFPs, entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
The environment shapes the expectations, norms and assumptions of entrepreneurs and investors. 
Especially entrepreneurial failure deserves further discussion. In this regard, the number of 
global business failures, as measured by the D&B Global Insolvency Index (GSI) was 91.9 
worldwide in Q4 2011. The proportions varied widely across the world, however. The GSI was 
80.3 for North America and 114.6 for Eastern Europe. Economies with higher failure rates are 
characterized by the existence of inherent institutional barriers and rigidities that might prevent 
entrepreneurial activities and innovation. For instance, such economies may lack entrepreneurial 
success stories irrespective of the sources of financing. Due to the lack of sufficient role models, 
ECF promotors find it difficult to demonstrate the superiority of the ECF model in terms of the 
performance and functional efficiency. 
 
It is also worth emphasizing that notwithstanding their connotation of inertia and resistance to 
change (Hoffman, 1999), persistence (Parto, 2005) and stability (Scott, 2001), institutions are 
subject to change. This means that more supportive ECF-related institutions are likely to emerge 
in countries that are characterized by institutions that are unsupportive to ECF. A related point is 
that some initiating events or triggers also known as disruptive events or jolts (Meyer, 1982) can 
overcome institutional inertia. There is some anecdotal evidence of a similar mechanism in the 
ECF market. Some argue that the 2011 earthquake acted as a jolt for Japan's CF landscape. 
Haruka Mera, who founded the ReadyFor? put the issue this way: “Compared with the US or 
UK, the whole concept of crowdfunding does not come naturally to the Japanese. But I think that 
things have changed a lot since the [2011] earthquake. Japanese society was given a very big 
reminder that it needs to work together to make things happen and to take the country forward” 
(Lewis, 2016). In Japan, many people are making CF investments in businesses in Northern part 
which was affected by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. They do so to “sympathize with the 
companies and their efforts” (bloomberg.com, 2015). 
 
The CF movement is the result of the Internet, which makes it possible to reach a wider group of 
people. While some of the factors noted above may also be applicable and important in the 
context of non-electronic crowdfunding, most of the independent variables (e.g., thin trust, trust 
in Internet, and benevolence) implicitly or explicitly deal with issues involving fundraising with 
strangers. Likewise, some of the associated mechanisms are more likely to be present in the 
context of Internet-based CF. For instance, crowdfunders are more likely to notice success as 
well as failure due to reviews and comments in social media sites, which is likely to lead to 
higher degree of perceived humiliation. Similarly, some trade associations provide training to 
entrepreneurs and project initiators on the management of advertising campaign on the Internet. 
 
We noted above that formal institutions related to ECF affect informal institutions. Equally 
interesting and important are the effects of informal institutions on formal institutions. North 
(1994) observes that informal rules provide legitimacy to formal rules. Likewise, Axelrod (1997, 
p. 61) commented that “social norms can become formalized into laws”. When ECF becomes an 
increasingly accepted source of entrepreneurial financing and an investment option, regulators 
may face pressures to new ECF-related policies laws. Likewise, lobbying by CF-related trade 
associations may lead to new ECF laws. 
 
Finally, it is erroneous and misleading to imply that more ECF is always a good thing. In the 
presence of clear ECF legislations and effective enforcement mechanisms, ECF received by 
entrepreneurs with appropriate skills, expertise, experience and training that are inclined to 
contribute to the greater good can lead to positive economic and social outcomes. In the absence 
of one or more of these, substantial benefits of ECF cannot be anticipated and the risks may even 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
5.1. Interactions among various factors 
 
Interaction effects among the variables noted above mean that they may move together as a 
whole. At the same time evaluating the independent effect of an individual variable has value in 
the sense that it provides a mechanism to influence the whole by influencing a particular unit. In 
this way, we can see how it is possible to create virtuous or vicious circles of ECF. 
 
An understanding of the degree and nature of the interaction among various factors thus would 
provide a valuable way to influence the ECF market. For instance, we may expect to see 
differential effects of informal institutions examined above (boxes in gray in Fig. 1) on 
entrepreneurs' propensity to engage in efforts to raise IECF and investors' propensity to invest in 
IECF in societies characterized by different degrees of institutionalization of ECF. For instance, 
a higher negative effect of the lack of thin trust on investors' propensity to invest in IECF may be 
seen in a market characterized by a low degree of institutionalization of CF. 
 
Based on the prior research in institutionalization (Axelrod and Cohen, 2001), it can be expected 
that in economies that exhibit a high degree of institutionalization of ECF, there is likelihood of 
the formation of a dense network of relationships among various actors in the institutional field 
formed around ECF. Such a condition is likely to reduce incentives for opportunism. Dense 
relationships and interactions are also likely to generate a lot of “gossips”, which would help 
enhance trust. 
 
It can also be argued that the degree of trust placed in online transactions will be of reduced 
importance when the important values and norms are institutionalized in the ECF market. 
Entrepreneurs may experiment with alternative solutions that can be used to overcome the 
limitations of online payment methods. The search for alternative means and methods of 
payment that can take over in part the role of the Internet as a payment channel. 
 
Likewise, potential entrepreneurs are less likely to worry about failure and hence being 
stigmatized if other conditions in the gray boxes are favorable to ECF. For instance, 
entrepreneurs are likely to feel more confident about their success if CF-related trade 
associations exist to provide help and support, people have a high level of thin trust, consumers 
are experienced and comfortable in online transactions and the society has a long experience 
with philanthropic institutions. 
 
5.2. Managerial and policy implications 
 
Governments and private sector actors (e.g., trade associations and CFPs) that want to stimulate 
the growth of the ECF market should consider the key features of the institutional environment. 
To be effective, their roles need to take account of the informal institutional factors. Actions, 
initiatives, and measures taken to develop the ECF market need to address specific challenges 
related to such institutions. 
 
Especially in countries characterized by a low degree of thin trust, ECF legislation is among the 
most critical needs. If formal mechanisms are created to provide trust on ECF, entrepreneurs and 
crowdfunders do not have to depend on personal or organizational characteristics or past 
exchange history. Zucker (1986) refers to this phenomenon as institutionally based trust, ECF 
legislation should not only be enacted but must also be enforced. 
 
Potential crowdfunders may not have pre-existing relationship with the project initiator. In such 
cases, the required trust may flow through some form of community such as those based on 
geography, culture, ethnicity, or shared interests (e.g., diaspora communities) (Information for 
Development Program (infoDev/The World Bank, 2013). This mechanism is especially relevant 
in societies characterized by a low degree of thin trust. In such societies, CF campaigns may also 
benefit by moving away from online to offline mechanisms. 
 
Different interventional approaches may be needed in societies characterized by a low degree of 
trust in online transactions. For instance, governments can increase trust by punishing people 
who are engaged in scams. A well-regulated online marketplace can strengthen investor 
protections. 
 
The paper provides a description of the scope and degree of challenges that are experienced by 
entrepreneurs that want to pursue ECF. Most CF campaigns fail. One estimate suggested that 
over 63% projects funded by Kickstarter and 90% on Indiegogo failed. Observers have noted an 
increase in failure rates over time (Volmut, 2016). Communications may help to close the gap 
between hope and realistic expectation and enable potential entrepreneurs to make informed 
decisions regarding ECF. Such measures can also increase preparedness to deal with a failure. 
 
Institutional actors interested in promoting ECF must fight on two fronts. Governments, CFPs 
and other actors can initiate efforts against the stigma of business failure. Studies conducted in 
other areas (e.g., mental illness) indicate that education plays a key role in changing negative 
perceptions of entrepreneurial failures (Gaebel and Baumann, 2003). For instance, first hand 
interactions with entrepreneurs from countries with conducive entrepreneurial culture, who 
initially failed but subsequently succeeded, can change the way individuals view business failure. 
It is also important to address the sources of business failure. For instance, key sources of failure 
emphasized in the entrepreneurship literature include the lack of professional advisors, 
education, and marketing (Lussier, 1995). Major efforts and initiatives will be needed to improve 
access to education and training related to entrepreneurship, management and marketing skills. 
 
Measures can be taken to accelerate the maturity of the CF market. Especially education and 
training of potential crowdfunders need to be strengthened. Especially In less mature CF 
markets, CFPs need to invest more time, efforts, attention and resources in creating awareness 
among potential investors and training entrepreneurs. Interfirm linkages, resource mobilization 
structures and economic interest groups such as trade associations play key roles in developing 
ECF-friendly informal institutions. For instance, through trade associations, CFPs can work with 
the relevant authorities in developing self-regulation and voluntary codes. CFPs also need to 
engage advocacy and lobbying activities to influence governments in enacting ECF friendly 
regulations. It is also important to work with international and inter-governmental institutions 
such as the UN and the World Bank to harmonize cross-national ECF-related institutions. 
 
The above discussion suggests that informal institutions in a country determine the relative 
success of CFPs with different foci and purposes. The relative probability of raising ECF vis-à-
vis other types of CF (e.g., donation and reward) varies across countries with different types of 
institutions. For instance, ECFPs are likely to be relatively more successful than reward- or 
donation-based platforms in countries with low degrees of philanthropy. 
 
One implication of Proposition 5 is that CFPs can encourage philanthropy by more effectively 
demonstrating the impact of philanthropic contributions made by crowdfunders. For instance, 
a first-hand account from the beneficiaries of philanthropic actions may provide more 
convincing information for potential funders regarding the impacts of such actions, which is 
likely to motivate them to invest in such projects. ECFPs may also consider allocating some 
proportion of the proceeds to of philanthropic contributions. 
 
CFPs, singly and collectively, can take measures to create an entrepreneurial environment that 
encourages crowdfunders to invest in ECF. For instance, efforts such as providing potential 
crowdfunders with more education, publicizing success stories and increasing media attention on 
ECF is likely to increase investors' willingness to participate in ECF. This strategy can help 
change the perceptions and attitudes of investors that consider ECF as illegitimate, and 
imprudent. Such a strategy has been employed to promote entrepreneurship in some economies. 
For instance, to support and encourage local entrepreneurship, Puerto Rico's largest daily 
newspaper, El Nuevo Día, devoted a weekly page of start-up success stories. The stories 
promoted new forms of social dialogue and created awareness about the ingredients and effects 
of entrepreneurship. Collaboration with entrepreneurial events and key entrepreneurial actors 
may provide a channel to build a culture of trust (Information for Development Program 
(infoDev/The World Bank, 2013). 
 
In order to successfully launch an ECF project in a country, it may require changing or adapting 
business models to fit the local institutional conditions. For instance, due to the lack of trust in 
online transactions in Vietnam, the project initiators of the cartoon series, Long Than Tuong 
provided backers with a wide range of payment options such as transferring through banks, ATM 
payments, Mobiphone credits. They also hired a service called giaohangnhanh.vn to collect 
money from homes. Likewise, a key aspect of Idea.Me's localization involved the use of various 
payment options acceptable in the LAC region including cash and other methods to account for 
the region's risk aversion. It became the region's first CFP to support Bitcoins. Paypal, 
MercadoPago (a popular mode of payment for local consumers and businesses in Argentina, 
Colombia and Mexico), DineroMail (a mode for local payments in Chile) and Moip (which is 
used for local payments in Brazil). Idea.Me's websites are in Spanish, Portuguese and English. 
Crowdfunders can pay with almost all regional currencies such as Argentine and Mexican Pesos, 
Brazilian Real and US$ (Brkan, 2015). These examples make it clear that when entrepreneurs or 
investors cross borders, they should be aware of local differences in CF-related institutions and 
do what they can to compensate for these differences. 
 
The issue related to the lack of online trust could be easier to address than the lack of thin trust. 
For instance, a vast body of evidence has shown that online customer trust is likely to develop 
between customers and companies over time and after repeated transactions (Koufaris and 
Hampton-Sosa, 2004). Prior research has suggested that direct physical experiences with a 
company's store and/or its salespeople is likely to lead to the development of trust (Doney and 
Cannon, 1997). 
 
5.3. Future research implications 
 
Before concluding, we suggest several potentially fruitful avenues for future research. First, 
future researchers are encouraged to empirically test the propositions presented in this paper. The 
dependent variables–an entrepreneur's willingness to engage in and ability to raise ECF and an 
investor's propensity to invest in ECF-- can be measured by means of surveys or behavioral data 
obtained from CFPs. For instance, surveys can be conducted to measure stated or revealed 
preferences to ECF over other financing and investment options. An entrepreneur's ability to 
raise ECF can be measured by her/his performance (e.g., probability of success for those who 
tried) in raising such funds. While constructs related to the trust in online transactions (P4) could 
be difficult to measure, in Table 7, we offer some ideas as to how independent variables related 
to the remaining six propositions can be measured. 
 
Table 7. Measuring the independent variables. 
Variable and related 
proposition(s) 
Explanation 
Stigmatization of 
entrepreneurial failure (P1) 
• Ernst & Young's barometer score in the G20 Entrepreneurship Barometer 2013, can be used 
which measures entrepreneurs' attitudes toward failure. The scores measure the degree of 
tolerance and penalties associated with business failure (Ey.com, 2013) 
• Some studies have compared economies and regions in terms of the degree of societal stigma 
associated with entrepreneurial failure (e.g., Cave et al., 2001, European Commission, 1998). 
Ordinal scale measures can be used to compare economies covered by these studies. 
Existence of CF-related trade 
associations (P2) 
• A dichotomous variable: existence/non-existence of a CF-related trade associations. 
Thin trust (P3) • Trust index (Medrano, 2016). 
The degree of philanthropic 
involvement (P5) 
• Charities Aid foundation's WGI score, which is based on three indicators of giving behavior: 
proportion of people donating money to charity, volunteering time, and helping a stranger in a 
typical month (CAF, 2014). 
The existence of regulatory 
framework for ECF (P6) 
• A dichotomous variable: Existence or non-existence of ECF laws. 
The amount of ECF-related 
activities (P7) 
• ECF as a proportion of total investment or GDP 
• A count of the number of activities undertaken by different actors related to ECF 
 
To measure the stigmatization of failure, Ernst & Young's barometer score in the G20 
Entrepreneurship Barometer 2013, can be used which measures entrepreneurs' attitudes toward 
failure. The scores measure the degree of tolerance and penalties associated with business failure 
(Ey.com, 2013). In addition, some studies have examined cross-national differences in the 
stigmatization of failure. For instance, Cave et al. (2001) found that entrepreneurs in the U.K. 
perceived a higher societal stigma of failure compared to those in the U.S. Such a stigma 
attached to business failure is arguably deeply ingrained in the British culture (Cope, 2011). 
Likewise, the European Commission (1998) notes: “In Europe, a serious social stigma is 
attached to bankruptcy. In the USA bankruptcy laws allow entrepreneurs who fail to start again 
relatively quickly and failure is considered to be part of the learning process. In Europe those 
who go bankrupt tend to be considered as “losers". They face great difficulty in obtaining 
finance for a new venture” (European Commission, 1998). Ordinal scale measures can be used to 
compare economies covered by these studies. 
 
A dichotomous variable representing the existence/non-existence of a CF-related trade 
associations can be used for P2. Thin trust can be measured with trust index. Data from various 
sources such as World Values Survey, Latinobarómetro, Globalbarometer and East-Asian 
barometer have been compiled by Medrano (2016). Likewise, WGI can be used to measure 
independent variable related to P5: the degree of philanthropic involvement. During the early 
stage of the development of the CF industry, a dichotomous variable (existence/nonexistence) of 
bespoke ECF regulation can be used to measure independent variable related to P6. ECF as a 
proportion of total investment or GDP can be used as a measure of ECF market maturity. It can 
also be measured with the time elapsed since the launch of the first ECF project. 
 
Another potentially interesting future research topic would be to explore the development of the 
CF market in an economy characterized by extreme values of some of the independent variables. 
One interesting case to analyze, for instance, would be Myanmar which ranked #1 in terms of the 
WGI in 2014. While there have been some CF campaigns initiated by foreigners that have 
focused on charity and social projects in Myanmar, the country's CF market is in infant state of 
development (Supetran, 2016). An in-depth case study of the CF market in economies such as 
Myanmar can be used in analyzing contexts that matter for the development of this market. 
 
Third, while we limited our analysis to the roles of informal institutions, formal institutions are 
no less important. Indeed, formal institutions affect ECF more than other forms of CF. In this 
regard, one issue that was raised in this article but not fully developed was the evolution of ECF-
related legislations. In future work scholars need to compare and contrast the evolution of formal 
institutions affecting ECF. For instance, future researchers can investigate the characteristics that 
differentiate countries that enact ECF legislation from those that do not. 
 
Another research agenda would be to compare the existence of and differences between ECF 
laws in countries with different investment cultures. For instance, in Japan, over half of the 
US$15.7 trillion household assets are in cash or at banks. Only 11% of the assets are in stocks or 
bonds in Japan compared with 42% in the U.S. and 23% in Europe (Warnock, 2014). Likewise, 
as noted above, bank lending accounted for 55% of corporate financing in China in 2012 (Walter 
et al., 2003). There are reasons to believe that investment culture that promotes financial assets 
such as stocks and bonds can easily be adapted to the ECF. As noted above, informal institutions 
affect formal institutions (Axelrod, 1997, Hayek, 1979). In this regard, future researchers might 
investigate how the pattern of ECF legislation varies across countries with different propensities 
to invest in securities such as stocksand bonds. 
 
Fifth, future research might also explore how entrepreneurs with different socioeconomic status 
and demographic characteristics differ in their willingness to engage in ECF. Especially there has 
been an interest in promoting women's entrepreneurship in recent years. In this regard, 
researchers could also look at how the effects of various factors in Fig. 1 on entrepreneurs' 
willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activities differ for men and women. 
 
Another interesting future research direction would be to study the nature of a jolt and its 
interaction with the institutional setting that may cause ECF to grow. For instance, as noted 
above, the 2011 earthquake acted as a trigger that led the Japanese to contribute to ECF 
initiatives. On the other hand, some other recent major earthquakes such as those that hit Haiti in 
2010, Nepal in 2015 and Ecuador and Italy in 2016 were not reported to have any visible impact 
on ECF in the affected countries. In the future, researchers may want to examine the natures of 
informal institutions that might be affected by environmental jolts. 
 
Seventh, future research might examine the differences in profiles of entrepreneurs that prefer 
ECF versus crowdloans. Various factors discussed above are likely to have differential effects on 
ECF and crowdloans. For instance, compared to crowdloans, ECF investors often want more 
information and like to a have active presence in the company's day to day running. In case of 
failure, an entrepreneur supported by a crowdloan may experience a lower degree of humiliation 
compared to one backed by ECF. 
 
Finally, researchers could analyze the possible interaction effects among various combinations of 
independent variables noted above. For instance, future researchers might want to investigate 
whether the effects of CF-related trade associations on entrepreneurs' propensity to engage in 
efforts to raise IECF varies across different levels of stigmatization of business failure. Likewise, 
researchers could examine whether the effect of the degree of trust in online transactions on 
investors' propensity to invest in IECF varies across societies characterized by different degree of 
thin trust. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
Supportive informal institutions are a key to the development of the ECF industry and market. 
The above discussion makes it clear that building a climate of trust and high-quality relationships 
between entrepreneurs and crowdfunders is an important prerequisite to the development of the 
ECF market. The creation of trust in online transaction is also crucial. 
 
One important observation relevant to countries that are characterized by less supportive 
informal institutions is that such institutions change. Among the mechanisms by which more 
supportive informal institutions can be developed include the enactment and enforcement of ECF 
legislation and development of high quality relationship among key actors. More supportive 
institutions are also likely to evolve as ECF markets become more mature and attract diverse 
participants. 
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